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The “New” American Way of War
U.S. Army War College
XIV Annual Strategy Conference
Compiled by
Lieutenant Colonel Raymond A. Millen
Strategic Studies Institute
Key Insights:
•

The threats posed by new geostrategic realities render the so-called Weinberger and Powell
doctrines obsolete.

•

Released by the Cold War shackles, the United States exerts an assertive foreign policy
emboldened by its unchallenged military dominance.

•

The United States may act unilaterally to eliminate dire threats or multilaterally to bolster
alliances and foster legitimacy.

•

Preemptive strategy is neither new nor applicable for all threats, but one of many available
options.

•

Preemptive war and preventive war are strikingly different concepts that should not be
confused, less they be misapplied.

•

In modern conflicts, the issues of collateral damage, speed of response, and long-term
presence assume greater importance.

•

Decisive military victory does not equal strategic success.

•

Transformation heralds a 21st century force with focus on information superiority, shared
awareness, nonlinear battlefield, and demassification.

•

Coherent jointness means the services operate and think as a cohesive entity.

•

The United Nations must adapt to the evolving international security environment.

•

The changing nature of the international security environment will require the United States
to fight long, deliberate, and sometimes indecisive conflicts.

This year’s topic, “The ‘New’ American Way of War,” was particularly relevant because it occurred during the
height of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). Over 130 national security strategists, including ten flag officers, from the
Department of Defense, civilian universities, and other policy-related institutions participated in the conference, held
April 8-10, 2003. As OIF demonstrated, the U.S. military is in the midst of changing the way it fights wars. With such a
backdrop unfolding, the speakers and panelists used very clear topical examples to make their points.

“indians.” Thus, the past as prologue to the future is what
Americans should expect.
A popular myth characterizes American generalship
as embracing boldness, innovation, and risk. The historical
account reveals that, although such generalship is tolerated
with successful generals, it is rarely encouraged. The
military remains a student of Jomini and Fuller, focused
on force ratios and firepower formulas. Development of
bold, innovative leaders may be fundamental, but good
staff work (much undervalued) creates the environment
for innovation, and the commander assesses the need
for boldness. On the other hand, American armies have
achieved great success with centralized, risk-averse
approaches, so why change? Inculcating and encouraging
boldness and innovation will require major paradigm
shifts in the military culture and significantly increase
associated risks. One could argue that the United States
should focus on producing competent leaders who
understand and follow doctrine, a centralized command
and control, and well-trained and fully-resourced staffs.
Dr. Brian Linn introduced three schools of thought
regarding the American ways of war: the Continentalists, the
Warriors, and the Strategists. Each school has shaped and
continues to shape how America fights wars. Although not
always in accord, they do complement each other and deserve
continued study and application as the United States lays out
a new course. In this pursuit, a revival of America’s military
intellectual past is essential.

Dr. Russell Weigley: The American Way of War.
The keynote speaker was the preeminent American
historian, Dr. Russell Weigley, whose book, The American
Way of War, inspired this year’s theme. Dr. Weigley
recounted that the United States continually has modified
how it fights wars. The strategy of attrition during the
War of Independence reflected the nation’s weakness, but
this gave way to a strategy of annihilation during the last
year of the Civil War. General Grant’s strategy influenced
the American way of war well into the 20th century. The
key components were the mobilization of vast resources
during war, direct confrontation of an enemy, and
pursuit of the quickest route to decisive victory. While
this doctrine failed in Korea and Vietnam, Americans
prefer this method of waging war. Still, this preference
creates friction with friends and allies, particularly given
the U.S. prowess at high-tech war. Over-exuberance with
technology raises expectations of limited casualties in
warfighting, resulting in frustration and recriminations
should high casualties arise. Dr. Weigley observed that,
although it is not yet clear what the new American way
of war will be, it must reflect the two characteristics that
made Ulysses Grant the greatest of American generals:
flexibility in method and resolution in purpose.
The American Way of War: Alternative Views.
With Dr. Earl Tilford moderating the panel, Dr.
Frank Hoffman, Mr. Max Boot, and Dr. Conrad Crane
examined various past influences that have shaped
the American approach to warfighting. One important
influence is culture, which is the key to understanding
how a government and its military institutions approach
war. This culture is shaped by geopolitics, myth, and
the aggregate experience. The current U.S. military
interpretation of war is based primarily on the so-called
Weinberger and Powell doctrines, legacies of the Vietnam
War designed as a set of criteria for the use of force.
However, the dynamic and chaotic post-Cold War world
renders these doctrines impracticable. The emerging U.S.
doctrine must acknowledge strategic threats and realities
if security is to be assured. Optimistically, the hallmark of
U.S. culture, however, is its ability to adapt to changing
situations.
The Weinberger-Powell doctrines assert that America
should avoid fighting small wars of limited liability
where possible. This viewpoint belies the U.S. historical
record, which reveals a plethora of limited wars across
the globe since the War of Independence, and the war
with Iraq is no exception. These small wars (mostly
guerrilla) were predominantly political rather than the
strict military confrontation the myth of the “big war”
engenders. Moreover, most of America’s small wars have
been successes, and recognizing that fact as the norm
for future wars is more productive than the irrational
mania surrounding the Vietnam War experience. The
United States will not be fighting peers, it will be fighting

The Emerging Strategic Environment and the American
Way of War.
Colonel Rich Yarger moderated this panel, which
featured Mr. Tom Donnelly, Dr. John Ikenberry, Dr. Hank
Gaffney, and Dr. Jane Lute. One viewpoint averred that U.S.
dominance has created a unipolar strategic environment.
Despite charges of unilateralism, the National Security
Strategy does not embrace unilateral action exclusively
nor has the United States acted unilaterally in Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM. However, the United States must not
balk from using its military preeminence to roll back
radical Islam and democratize the Middle East, while
hedging against a future threat from China. The United
States should foster institutions with expeditionary forces
that can respond to crises immediately rather than relying
on failed institutions like NATO, EU, and UN. The United
States should embrace its unipolar position and embark
on creating new permanent coalitions.
Another viewpoint argued that a multilateral grand
strategy lay at the heart of the U.S. construction of a
world order. Alliances are part of a larger security system
that has defended the United States and its allies against
threats, secured U.S. presence abroad in a legitimate and
predictable order, and inhibited the rise of counteralliances
against the United States. Washington does not fully
understand the need and benefits of such a system and
prefers to act unilaterally against emerging threats,
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relying on its military and technological superiority. The
former U.S. security system not only defended against the
Soviet threat but also created institutions and legitimate
order based on a positive agenda of liberal democracy.
It ensured regular consultations and cooperation and
requires no reinvention. The United States protected allies,
fostered open and free economic markets, and purposely
practiced self-constraint to assure allies and promote
stability.
A third perspective pointed out that a Center for Naval
Analysis study on the use of force since 1989 reveals that
conflicts are not quick affairs. Most crises emerged from
enduring problems, and the United States reacted very
deliberately in resolving them. As a modus operandi, the
United States has sought support and partners abroad and
also enjoyed remarkable success in securing forward bases
in support of operations. Air strikes initiated hostilities to
enervate the enemy but were not in themselves decisive.
Joint operations were essential and reflected increasingly
networked capabilities; but they were kept under strict
political control. Most importantly, the end-state required
an enduring presence measured in years, not months.
Post-war Iraq will be no different and will require a large
air, ground, and naval presence even while the United
States combats Al-Qaida.
The final, insightful perspective invoked the real
strategic question of how the United States should use
its power for immediate global access and domination
of ground, sea, air, and information warfare capability.
The old paradigm of interests, capabilities, and threats no
longer applies because the United States has unbounded
capabilities and has set the precedent of deploying forces
on behalf of causes or against threats that are remote
from vital interests. The emerging strategic environment
complicates matters. Governance is becoming ever more
internationalized. States are losing the monopoly on the
use of force, the creation of wealth, and the ability to forge
coalitions on an increasing basis─these are devolving
to the individual. These changes force states to act with
ever greater transparency and accountability including
military means. Consequently, traditional legitimate uses
of force will be increasingly constrained.

speed of attack, and a long-term presence for the purpose
of reconstruction are assuming greater import.
Strategic preemption may define the new American
way of war, but its distinction from preventive war
is becoming blurred. President Bush has stated that
deterrence and containment are no longer viable concepts
in many emerging conflicts, and the NSS reflects the view
that the United States will not wait for threats to manifest
themselves into attacks before taking action. Despite the
attractiveness of preemption, the concept is not new to
U.S. policy because the idea of preemptive nuclear strikes
existed during the Cold War. The Bush administration
is simply codifying a tradition of national security
thought rather than generating a radical new doctrine.
Still, preemption and prevention are strikingly different
concepts.
The United States will not necessarily apply the
preemptive strategy to all threats though. The war
against Iraq was clearly the application of this of a
preventive strategy but not a signal that the United
States will apply either in every case. Many current
threats may cause concern to the administration but are
not imminent. The administration was initially deeply
concerned about wearing out the force and was highly
selective about defining the national security missions
that it sought to pursue, hence the intention to withdraw
from peacekeeping and nation-building missions. The
administration also sought to restructure the military by
relying more on airpower and a smaller, swifter ground
component; however the events surrounding 9-11 have
required a reassessment of that initiative.
Richard Perle: The ‘New’ American Way of War and
Tomorrow’s Security Challenges.
Post-Iraq war evaluations will be positive and may
conclude that the war set major historic events in motion.
This may be the first war of the “New American Army”
and may signal the need for a change of the UN mandate,
to make it more effective for 21st century threats, not
as a reactor to the cross-border confrontations of the
previous century. To remain viable, the UN must become
an appropriate arbiter that supports necessary defense
decisions before overt aggressive materializes. The Army
must accelerate Transformation with emphasis on power
projection; precision weapons; a smaller, lighter, more
lethal force; and a requisite doctrine.

The ‘New’ American Way of War and National Security
Strategy (NSS)/ National Military Strategy (NMS).
Dr. Robin Dorff moderated this panel comprising
CAPT Sam Tangredi, Dr. Loren Thompson and Dr.
Daniel Goure. U.S. NSS and NMS documents are quite
straightforward and lay out exactly how the current U.S.
administration seeks to use military power for preemption
of hostile nations seeking weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) capabilities. NSS seeks to dissuade adversarial
nations from future military competition with the United
States. Just as there are different types of wars, the United
States must be capable of fighting them in different ways.
Unlike past conflicts, the issues of collateral damage,

The Road Ahead: Defense Transformation and the
‘New’ American Way of War.
Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski and Brigadier
General (Promotable) Michael Vane comprised this panel
with Colonel Mike Matheny moderating. Transformation
reflects the shift of the military focus from fighting great
power wars to fighting as a great power force. A greater
reliance on strategic deployment translates to fewer forces
deployed forward and less reliance on allies. Future trends
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point towards information superiority, shared awareness,
nonlinear battlefield, and demassification. Traditional
separate processes (e.g., organize, maneuver, jointness)
will eventually merge into one process─employment.
Because the U.S. Army is changing into an expeditionary
force, regional infrastructures will not be required to
support warfighting. Network centric warfare also
permits a greater contribution of forces in combat. Of
course, not all embrace Transformation unquestionably.
Persistent rigidity in training, misplaced emphasis
on mass, doctrinaire thinking, and refusal to exploit
interdependencies illustrate a few of the obstacles, but the
strategic environment demands adaptation.
A critical component of Transformation is jointness.
The goal is to achieve coherent jointness, meaning the
services operate, think, and speak alike as a cohesive
force. The armed forces must eschew the inclination
to limit jointness to simple deconfliction, meaning the
services operate separately and sequentially to avoid
operational entanglements. It complements rather than
replaces service cultures. For jointness to endure, services
must infuse it in key areas such as lift, logistics, space, and
ISR. Moreover, jointness must become inculcated through
leadership, training, and war gaming, such as Unified
Quest. Lastly, jointness must be instituted from captain to
flag rank through schools and joint war games.

the particular circumstances involved, the SOF-AlliesPrecision Bombing formula worked, but its applicability to
other conflicts must be tempered by serious examination
and not as a formula. Regardless, the role of ground power
is a sine qua non to the new American way of war.
Conference Wrap-up: Assessment and Critique.
Dr. Douglas Lovelace moderated this final panel
comprising Dr. Robin Dorff, Dr. Jeffrey Record, Dr.
Grant Hammond, and Dr. Marybeth Ulrich. Events in
Iraq clearly support the contention that there is a new
way of conducting war and it, under certain conditions,
is likely to be a successful way. The new conduct of war
is not attrition warfare but is increasingly technologically
based, faster moving over greater distances, fought by
smaller formations and more precise in selecting targets
and hitting those targets.
The new way retains aspects of the old in that it is still
chaotic, requires flexibility, requires effective leadership, is
inextricably linked to other sources of national power, and
should be conducted in the context of a grand strategy.
At the strategic level, it is not yet clear if Iraq is an
aberrant example of warfare or represents a new way of
war in that it is a preventative war, less concerned with
international approval, and less multilateral. The danger
of this becoming our new way is that to sustain such
policies may result in political isolation and a fear of U.S.
power.

The Present as Prelude to the Future: Has Tomorrow
Arrived?

Conclusions.

With Dr. Douglas Johnson presiding, this panel
featured Mr. James Howe, Dr. Steve Biddle, and Dr.
Steven Metz. Missile technology is creating increasingly
smaller, cost effective, and more accurate missiles, which
will permit the United States to project power immediately
and with greater effect. Their increasing sophistication
will herald a very different kind of warfare and forces
necessary to prosecute it.
The new American way of war must reflect emerging
forms of armed conflict. The devolution of warfare
describes a blend of state and nonstate actors with little
distinction between war and peace. Nonstate actors will be
self-funded, networked, and unconstrained by laws and
rules. To counter the U.S. dominance, states and nonstates
will adopt asymmetric warfare and moral ambiguities.
Hence, the United States must be prepared to fight
slow, deliberate and perhaps even indecisive conflicts.
Decisiveness requires: strategic, operational and tactical
vision to anticipate threats and form an accurate picture
of the battlespace; decisional, strategic, operational, and
tactical speed to permit the United States to respond to
threats sufficiently; tactical, strategic, and psychological
precision for permitting accuracy, limiting unintended
consequences, and achieving desired, controlled effects;
and government, nongovernment, and interagency
compatibility.
The U.S.-led war in Afghanistan illustrated that a
transformation of sorts took place. For that theater and

The 14th Annual Strategy Conference vetted the
implications, risks, and opportunities available to the
United States. No one can select with certainty the best
path to take, but relying on the status quo is not an option.
The conference provided an opportunity to discuss the
way ahead. Policymakers, academics, and senior leaders
can continue that dialogue.

*****
The views expressed in this brief are those of the author
and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position
of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense,
or the U.S. Government. This conference brief is cleared for
public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****
More information on the Strategic Studies Institute’s
programs may be found on the Institute’s Homepage at http:
//www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/index.html or by calling (717) 2454212.
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